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Abstract Malware analysis and detection techniques have been evolving during the
last decade as a reflection to development of different malware techniques to evade
network-based and host-based security protections. The fast growth in variety and
number of malware species made it very difficult for forensics investigators to pro-
vide an on time response. Therefore, Machine Learning (ML) aided malware analy-
sis became a necessity to automate different aspects of static and dynamic malware
investigation. We believe that machine learning aided static analysis can be used
as a methodological approach in technical Cyber Threats Intelligence (CTI) rather
than resource-consuming dynamic malware analysis that has been thoroughly stud-
ied before. In this paper, we address this research gap by conducting an in-depth
survey of different machine learning methods for classification of static character-
istics of 32-bit malicious Portable Executable (PE32) Windows files and develop
taxonomy for better understanding of these techniques. Afterwards, we offer a tuto-
rial on how different machine learning techniques can be utilized in extraction and
analysis of a variety of static characteristic of PE binaries and evaluate accuracy
and practical generalization of these techniques. Finally, the results of experimental
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study of all the method using common data was given to demonstrate the accuracy
and complexity. This paper may serve as a stepping stone for future researchers in
cross-disciplinary field of machine learning aided malware forensics.
1 Introduction
Stealing users’ personal and private information has been always among top inter-
ests of malicious programs [8]. Platforms which are widely used by normal users
have always been best targets for malware developers [9].
Attackers have leveraged malware to target personal computers [22], mobile de-
vices [61], cloud storage systems [13], Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Systems (SCADA) [12], Internet of Things (IoT) network [81] and even big data
platforms [67].
Forensics examiners and incident handlers on the other side have developed dif-
ferent techniques for detection of compromised systems, removal of detected ma-
licious programs [23, 14], network traffic [63], and even log analysis [69]. Differ-
ent models have been suggested for detection, correlation and analyses of cyber
threats [20] (on a range of mobile devices [43] and mobile applications [45], cloud
applications [11], cloud infrastructure [46] and Internet of Things networks [47]).
Windows users are still comprising majority of Internet users hence, it is not surpris-
ing to see Windows as the most adopted PC Operating System (OS) on top of the
list of malware targeted platforms [73]. In response, lots of efforts have been made
to secure Windows platform such as educating users [54, 25], embedding an anti-
virus software [40], deploying anti-malware and anti-exploitation tools [53, 52], and
limiting users applications privilege [41].
In spite of all security enhancements, many malware are still successfully com-
promising Windows machines [36, 73] and malware is still ranked as an important
threat to Windows platforms [33]. As result, many security professionals are still
required to spend a lot of time on analyzing different malware species [10]. This
is a logical step since malware analysis plays a crucial role in Cyber Threats In-
telligence (CTI). There has been proposed a portal to facilitate CTI and malware
analysis through interactive collaboration and information fusion [56].
There are two major approaches for malware analysis namely static (code) and
dynamic (behavioral) malware analysis [16, 8]. In dynamic malware analysis, sam-
ples are executed and their run time behavior such as transmitted network traffic,
the length of execution, changes that are made in the file system, etc. are used to
understand the malware behavior and create indications of compromise for mal-
ware detection [16]. However, dynamic analysis techniques can be easily evaded by
malware that are aware of execution conditions and computing environment [34].
Dynamic malware analysis techniques can only provide a snapshot view of the
malware behavior and hence very limited in analysis of Polymorph or Metamorph
species [44]. Moreover, dynamic malware analysis techniques are quite resource
hungry which limits their enterprise deployment [37].
In static malware analysis, the analyst is reversing the malware code to achieve a
deeper understanding of the malware possible activities. [28]. Static analysis relies
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on extraction of a variety of characteristics from the binary file such that function
calls, header sections, etc. [83]. Such characteristics may reveal indicators of mali-
cious activity that are going to be used in CTI [57]. However, static analysis is quite
a slow process and requires a lot of human interpretation and hence [8].
Static analysis of PE32 is a many-sided challenge that was studied by different
authors. Static malware analysis also was used before for discovering interconnec-
tions in malware species for improved Cyber Threat Intellifence [42, 66]. As 32-bit
malware are still capable of infecting 64-bit platforms and considering there are
still many 32-bit Windows OS it is not surprising that still majority of Windows
malware are 32-bit Portable Executable files [8]. To authors knowledge there has
not been a comparative study of ML-based static malware using a single dataset
which produces comparable results. We believe that utilization of ML-aided auto-
mated analysis can speed up intelligent malware analysis process and reduce human
interaction required for binaries processing. Therefore, there is a need for thorough
review of the relevant scientific contributions and offer a taxonomy for automated
static malware analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first offer a comprehen-
sive review of existing literature in machine learning aided static malware analysis.
We believe this survey paves the way for further research in application of machine
learning in static malware analysis and calls for further development in this field.
Then, taxonomy of feature construction methods for variety of static characteristics
and corresponding ML classification methods is offered. Afterwards, we offer a tu-
torial that applies variety of set of machine learning techniques and compares their
performance. The tutorial findings provide a clear picture of pros and cons of ML-
aided static malware analysis techniques. To equally compare all the methods we
used one benign and two malware datasets to evaluate all of the studied methods.
This important part complements the paper due to the fact that most of the surveyed
works used own collections, sometimes not available for public access or not pub-
lished at all. Therefore, experimental study showed performance comparison and
other practical aspects of ML-aided malware analysis. Section 4 gives an insight
into a practical routine that we used to establish our experimental setup. Analysis of
results and findings are given in the Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded and
several future works are suggested in the Section 6.
2 An overview of Machine Learning-aided static malware
detection
This section provides an analysis of detectable static properties of 32 bit PE malware
followed by detailed description of different machine learning techniques to develop
a taxonomy of machine learning techniques for static malware analysis.
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2.1 Static characteristics of PE files
PE file format was introduced in Windows 3.1 as PE32 and further developed as
PE32+ format for 64 bit Windows Operating Systems. PE files contain a Common
Object File Format (COFF) header, standard COFF fields such as header, section
table, data directories and Import Address Table (IAT). Beside the PE header fields
a number of other static features can be extracted from a binary executable such as
strings, entropy and size of various sections.
To be able to apply Machine Learning PE32 files static characteristics should
be converted into a machine-understandable features. There exist different types of
features depending on the nature of their values such that numerical that describes a
quantitative measure (can be integer, real or binary value) or nominal that describes
finite set of categories or labels. An example of the numerical feature is CPU (in %)
or RAM (in Megabytes) usage, while nominal can be a file type (like ∗.dll or ∗.exe)
or Application Program Interface (API) function call (like write() or read()).
1. n-grams of byte sequences is a well-known method of feature construction uti-
lizing sequences of bytes from binary files to create features. Many tools have
been developed for this purpose such as hexdump [39] created 4-grams from
byte sequences of PE32 files. The features are collected by sliding window of
n bytes. This resulted in 200 millions of features using 10-grams for about two
thousands files in overall. Moreover, feature selection (FS) was applied to select
500 most valuable features based on Information Gain metric. Achieved accu-
racy on malware detection was up to 97% using such features. Another work
on byte n-grams [51] described usage of 100-500 selected n-grams yet on a set
of 250 malicious and 250 benign samples. Similar approach [31] was used with
10, . . . ,10,000 best n-grams for n = 1, . . . ,10. Additionally, ML methods such
that Naive Bayes, C4.5, k-NN and others were investigated to evaluate their ap-
plicability and accuracy. Finally, a range of 1-8 n-grams [27] can result in 500
best selected n-grams that are used later to train AdaBoost and Random Forests
in addition to previously mentioned works.
2. Opcode sequences or operation codes are set of consecutive low level machine
abstractions used to perform various CPU operations. As it was shown [62] such
features can be used to train Machine Learning methods for successful classifica-
tion of the malware samples. However, there should be a balance between the size
of the feature set and the length of n-gram opcode sequence. N-grams with the
size of 4 and 5 result in highest classification accuracy as unknown malware sam-
ples could be unveiled on a collection of 17,000 malware and 1,000 benign files
with a classification accuracy up to 94% [58]. Bragen [6] explored reliability of
malware analysis using sequences of opcodes based on the 992 PE-files malware
and benign samples. During the experiments, about 50 millions of opcodes were
extracted. 1-gram- and 2-gram-based features showed good computational re-
sults and accuracy. Wang et al. [79] presented how the 2-tuple opcode sequences
can be used in combination with density clustering to detect malicious or benign
files.
4
Machine Learning Aided Static Malware Analysis: A Survey and Tutorial 5
3. API calls are the function calls used by a program to execute specific functional-
ity. We have to distinguish between System API calls that are available through
standard system DLLs and User API calls provided by user installed software.
These are designed to perform a pre-defined task during invocation. Suspicious
API calls, anti-VM and anti-debugger hooks and calls can be extracted by PE
analysers such as PEframe [4]. [83] studied 23 malware samples and found that
some of the API calls are present only in malwares rather than benign soft-
ware. Function calls may compose in graphs to represent PE32 header features as
nodes, edges and subgraphs [84]. This work shows that ML methods achieve ac-
curacy of 96% on 24 features extracted after analysis of 1,037 malware and 2,072
benign executables. Further, in [71] 20,682 API calls were extracted using PE
parser for 1,593 malicious and benign samples. Such large number of extracted
features can help to create linearly separable model that is crucial for many ML
methods as Support Vector Machines (SVM) or single-layer Neural Networks.
Another work by [55] described how API sequences can be analysed in analogy
with byte n-grams and opcode n-grams to extract corresponding features to clas-
sify malware and benign files. Also in this work, an array of API calls from IAT
(PE32 header filed) was processed by Fisher score to select relevant features after
analysis of more than 34k samples.
4. PE header represents a collection of meta data related to a Portable Executable
file. Basic features that can be extracted from PE32 header are Size of Header,
Size of Uninitialized Data, Size of Stack Reserve, which may indicate if a binary
file is malicious or benign [15]. The work [76] utilized Decision Trees to analyse
PE header structural information for describing malicious and benign files. [77]
used 125 raw header characteristics, 31 section characteristics, 29 section char-
acteristics to detect unknown malware in a semi-supervised approach. Another
work [80] used a dataset containing 7,863 malware samples from Vx Heaven
web site in addition to 1,908 benign files to develop a SVM based malware de-
tection model with accuracy of 98%. [38] used F-score as a performance met-
ric to analyse PE32 header features of 164,802 malicious and benign samples.
Also [29] presented research of two novel methods related to PE32 string-based
classier that do not require additional extraction of structural or meta-data infor-
mation from the binary files. Moreover, [84] described application of 24 features
along with API calls for classification of malware and benign samples from Vx-
Heaven and Windows XP SP3 respectively. Further, ensemble of features was
explored [59], where authors used in total 209 features including structural and
raw data from PE32 file header. Further, Le-Khac et al. [35] focused on Control
Flow Change over first 256 addresses to construct n-gram features.
In addition to study of specific features used for malware detection, we analyzed
articles devoted to application of ML for static malware analysis published between
2000 and 2016, which covers the timeline of Windows NT family that are still in use
as depicted in the Figure 1. We can see that the number of papers that are relevant
to our study is growing from 2009 and later, which can be justified on the basis
of increase in the number of Windows users (potential targets) and corresponding
malware families.
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Fig. 1: Timeline of works since 2009 that involved static analysis of Portable Exe-
cutable files using method characteristics using also ML method for binary malware
classification
Challenges. Despite the fact that some of the feature construction techniques
reflected promising precision of 90+ % in differentiation between malicious and
benign executables, there are still no best static characteristic that guarantee 100%
accuracy of malware detection. This can be explained by the fact that malware are
using obfuscation and encryption techniques to subvert detection mechanisms. In
addition, more accurate approaches such as bytes N-GRAMS are quite resource in-
tensive and hardly practical in the real world.
2.2 Machine Learning methods used for static-based malware
detection
2.2.1 Statistical methods
Exploring large amounts of binary files consists of statistical features may be sim-
plified using so called frequencies or likelihood of features values. These methods
are made to provide prediction about the binary executable class based on statistics
of different static characteristics (either automatically or manually collected) which
are applicable to malware analysis too as describe by Shabtai et al. [60]. To process
such data, extract new or make predictions the following set of statistical methods
can be used:
Naive Bayes is a simple probabilistic classifier, which is based on Bayesian theo-
rem with naive assumptions about independence in correlation of different features.
The Bayes Rule can be explained as a following conditional independences of fea-
tures values with respect to a class:
P(Ck|V ) = P(Ck)P(V |Ck)P(V ) (1)
6
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where P(Ck) is a prior probability of class Ck,k = 1, ...,m0 which is calcu-
lated from collected statistics according to description of variables provided by
Kononenko et al. [32]. This method is considered to tackle just binary classification
problem (benign against malicious) since it was originally designed as multinomial
classifier. V = 〈v1, ...,va〉 is the vector of attributes values that belongs to a sample.
In case of Naive Bayes input values should be symbolical, for example strings, op-
codes, instruction n-grams etc. P(V ) is the prior probability of a sample described
with vector V . Having training data set and given vector V we count how many
samples contain equal values of attributes (e.g. based on the number of sections or
given opcode sequence). It is important to mention that V have not to be of length
of full attribute vector and can contain only one attribute value. P(V |Ck) is the con-
ditional probability of a sample described with V given the class Ck. And P(Ck|V )
conditional probability of class Ck with V . Based on simple probability theory we
can describe conditional independence of attribute values vi given the class Ck:
P(V |Ck) = P(v1∧ ...∧ va|Ck) =
a
∏
i=1
P(vi|Ck) (2)
Dropping the mathematical operations we get final version of Equation 1:
P(Ck|V ) = P(Ck)
a
∏
i=1
P(Ck|vi)
P(Ck)
(3)
So, the task of this machine learning algorithm is to calculate conditional and
unconditional probabilities as described in the Equation 3 using a training dataset.
To be more specific, the Algorithm 1 pseudo code shows the calculation of the
conditional probability.
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Algorithm 1 Calculating P(Ck|V ) - conditional probability of class Ck with V
1: Sample structure with class label and attribute values
2: S← array of training Samples
3: V ← array of attribute values
4: Ck← class number
5: P Ck = 0
6: function get P Ck(ClassNumber,Samples)
7: out put = 0
8: for all sample from Samples do
9: if sample.getClass() ==ClassNumber then
10: out put+= 1size[Samples]
11: end if
12: end for
13: return out put
14: end function
15: function get P Ck vi(ClassNumber,v, i,Samples)
16: out put = 0
17: for all sample from Samples do
18: if sample.getClass() ==ClassNumber AND sample.getAttribute(i) == v then
19: out put+= 1size[Samples]
20: end if
21: end for
22: return out put
23: end function
24: P(Ck|V = 0)
25: prod = 1
26: i=0
27: for all v f romV do
28: prod∗= get P Ck vi(ClassNumber,v,i,Samples)get P Ck(ClassNumber,Samples)
29: i+= 1
30: end for
31: P(Ck|V ) = prod ∗get P Ck(ClassNumber,Samples))
So, we can see from the Equation 1 that given output is as a probability that a
questioned software sample belongs to one or another class. Therefore, the classifi-
cation decision will be made by finding a maximal value from set of corresponding
class likelihoods. Equation 4 provides formula that assigns class label to the output:
yˆ = argmax
k∈{1,...,K}
P(Ck)P(V |Ck). (4)
Bayesian Networks is a probabilistic directed acyclic graphical model (some-
times also named as Bayesian Belief Networks), which shows conditional depen-
dencies using directed acyclic graph. Network can be used to detect ”update knowl-
edge of the state of a subset of variables when other variables (the evidence vari-
ables) are observed” [32]. Bayesian Networks are used in many cases of classi-
fication and information retrieval (such as semantic search). The method’s routine
can be described as following. If edge goes from vertex A to vertex B, then A is a
parent of B, and B is an ancestor of A. If from A there is oriented path to another
8
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vertex B exists then B is ancestor of A, and A is a predecessor of B. Lets desig-
nate set of parent vertexes of vertex Vi as parents(Vi) = PAi. Direct acyclic graph is
called Bayesian Network for probability distribution P(v) given for set of random
variables V if each vertex of graph has matched with random variable from V . And
edge of a graph fits next condition: every variable vi from V must be conditionally
independent from all vertexes that are not its ancestors if all its direct parents PAi
are initialized in graph G:
∀Vi ∈V ⇒ P(vi|pai,s) = P(vi|pai) (5)
where vi is a value of Vi, S - set of all vertexes that are not ancestors of Vi, s -
configuration of S, pai - configuration of PAi. Then full general distribution of the
values in vertexes could be written as product of local distributions, similarly to
Naive Bayes rules:
P(V1, . . . ,Vn) =
n
∏
i=1
P(Vi | parents(Vi)) (6)
Bayesian Belief Networks can be used for classification [32], thus can be applied
for malware detection and classification as well [58]. To make Bayesian Network
capable of classification it should contain classes as parent nodes which don’t have
parents themselves. Figure 2 shows an example of such Bayesian network.
Fig. 2: Bayesian network suitable for malware classification [58]
2.2.2 Rule based
Rule based algorithms are used for generating crisp or inexact rules in different Ma-
chine Learning approaches [32]. The main advantage of having logic rules involved
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in malware classification is that logical rules that operate with statements like equal,
grater then, less or equal to can be executed on the hardware level which signifi-
cantly increases the speed of decision making.
C4.5 is specially proposed by Quinlan [50] to construct decision trees. These
trees can be used for classification and especially for malware detection [75]. The
process of trees training includes processing of previously classified dataset and on
each step looks for an attribute that divides set of samples into subsets with the
best information gain. C4.5 has several benefits in compare with other decision tree
building algorithms:
• Works not only with discrete but with continuous attributes as well. For continu-
ous attributes it creates threshold tp compares values against [49].
• Take into account missing attributes values.
• Works with attributes with different costs.
• Perform automate tree pruning by going backward through the tree and removing
useless branches with leaf nodes.
Algorithm 2 shows a simplified version of decision tree building algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Decision tree making algorithm
1: S = s1,s2, ... labelled training dataset of classified data
2: x1i,x2i, ...,xpi - p-dimensional vector of attributes of each sample si form S
3: Check for base cases
4: for all attributes x do
5: Find the normalized gain ratio from splitting set of sample on x
6: end for
7: Let xbest be the attribute with the highest normalized information gain.
8: Create decision node that splits on xbest
9: Repeat on the subsets created by splitting with xbest . Newly gained nodes add as children of
current node.
Neuro-Fuzzy is a hybrid models that ensembles neural networks and fuzzy logic
to create human-like linguistic rules using the power of neural networks. Neu-
ral network also known as artificial neural network is a network of simple ele-
ments which are based on the model of perceptron [65]. Perceptron implements
previously chosen activation functions which take input signals and their weights
and produces an output, usually in the range of [0,1] or [−1,1]. The network can
be trained to perform classification of complex and high-dimensional data. Neu-
ral Networks are widely used for classification and pattern recognition tasks, thus
for malware analysis [72]. The problem is that solutions gained by Neural Net-
works are usually impossible to interpret because of complexity of internal struc-
ture and increased weights on the edges. This stimulates usage of Fuzzy Logic tech-
niques, where generated rules are made in human-like easy-interpretable format:
IF X > 3 AND X < 5 T HEN Y = 7.
Basic idea of Neuro-Fuzzy (NF) model is a fuzzy system that is trained with a
learning algorithm similar to one from neural networks theory. NF system can be
10
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represented as a neural network which takes input variables and produces output
variables while connection weights are represented as encoded fuzzy sets. Thus at
any stage (like prior to, in process of and after training) NF can be represented as a
set of fuzzy rules. Self-Organising (Kohonen) maps [30] is the most common tech-
niques of combining Neuro and Fuzzy approaches. Shalaginov et al. [64] showed the
possibility of malware detection using specially-tuned Neuro-Fuzzy technique on a
small dataset. Further, NF showed good performance on large-scale binary problem
of network traffic analysis [63]. This method has also proven its efficiency on a set
of multinomial classification problems. In particular, it is useful when we are talking
about distinguishing not only ”malware” or ”goodware” but also detecting specific
type of ”malware” [68]. Therefore, it has been improved for the multinational clas-
sification of malware types and families by Shalaginov et al. [70].
2.2.3 Distance based
This set of methods is used for classification based on predefined distance measure.
Data for distance-based methods should be carefully prepared, because computa-
tional complexity grows significantly with space dimensionality (number of fea-
tures) and number of training samples. Thus there is a need for proper feature selec-
tion as well as sometimes for data normalization.
k-Nearest Neighbours or k-NN is classification and regression method. k-NN
does not need special preparation of the dataset or actual ”training” as the algorithm
is ready for classification right after labelling the dataset. The algorithm takes a
sample that is need to be classified and calculates distances to samples from training
dataset, then it selects k nearest neighbours (with shortest distances) and makes
decision based on class of this k nearest neighbours. Sometimes it makes decision
just on the majority of classes in this k neighbours selection, while in other cases
there is weights involved in process of making decision. When k-NN is used for
malware classification and detection there is a need for careful feature selection
as well as a methodology for dealing with outliers and highly mixed data, when
training samples cannot create distinguishable clusters [58].
Support Vector Machine or SVM is a supervised learning method. It constructs
one or several hyperplanes to divide dataset for classification. Hyperplane is con-
structed to maximize distance from it to the nearest data points. Sometimes kernel
transformation is used to simplify hyperplanes. Building a hyperplane is usually
turned into two-class problem (one vs one, one vs many) and involves quadratic
programming. Lets have linearly separable data (as shown in Figure 3) which can be
represented asD = {(xi,yi) | xi ∈ Rp, yi ∈ {−1,1}}ni=1. Where yi is 1 or -1 depend-
ing on class of point xi. Each xi is p-dimensional vector (not always normalised).
The task is to find hyperplane with maximum margin that divides dataset on points
with yi = 1 and yi =−1: w · x−b = 0. Where w is a normal vector to a hyperplane
[21]. If dataset is linearly separable we can build two hyperplanes w · x−b = 1 and
w · x− b = −1 between which there will be no (or in case of soft margin maximal
allowed number) points. Distance between them (margin) is 2||w|| , so to maximize
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margin we need to minimize ||w|| and to find parameters of hyperplane we need to
introduce Lagrangian multipliers α and solve Equation 7 with quadratic program-
ming techniques.
argmin
w,b
max
α≥0
{
1
2
‖w‖2−
n
∑
i=1
αi[yi(w ·xi−b)−1]
}
(7)
Fig. 3: Maximum margin hyperplane for two class problem [32]
Sometimes there is a need to allow an algorithm to work with misclassified data
hence leaving some points inside the margin based on the degree of misclassification
ξ . So the Equation 3 turns into Equation 8.
arg min
w,ξ ,b
max
α,β
{
1
2
‖w‖2+C
n
∑
i=1
ξi−
n
∑
i=1
αi[yi(w ·xi−b)−1+ξi]−
n
∑
i=1
βiξi
}
with αi,βi ≥ 0
(8)
Also the data might be linearly separated, so there is a need for kernel trick. The
basic idea is to substitute every dot product with non-linear kernel function. Kernel
function can be chosen depending on situation and can be polynomial, Gaussian,
hyperbolic etc. SVM is a very powerful technique which can give good accuracy
if properly used, so it often used in malware detection studies as shown by Ye et
al. [82].
12
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2.2.4 Neural networks
Neural Network is based on the model of perceptron which has predefined activation
function. In the process of training weights of the links between neurons are trained
to fit train data set with minimum error with use of back propagation. Artificial
Neural network (ANN) consists of input layer, hidden layer (layers) and output layer
as it is shown on Figure 4.
Fig. 4: Artificial neural network [32]
The input layer takes normalized data, while hidden output layer produces ac-
tivation output using neuron’s weighted input and activation function. Activation
function is a basic property of neuron that takes input values given on the input
edges, multiply them by weights of these edges and produces output usually in a
range of [0,1] or [-1,1]. Output layer is needed to present results and then interpret
them. Training of ANN starts with random initialization of weights for all edges.
Then feature vector of each sample is used as an input. Afterwards, result gained
on the output layer is compared to the real answers. Any errors are calculated and
using back-propagation all weights are tuned. Training can continue until reaching
desired number of training cycles or accuracy. Learning process of ANN can be pre-
sented as shown in the Algorithm 3. Artificial Neural networks can be applied for
complex models in high-dimensional spaces. This is why it often used for malware
research [72].
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Algorithm 3 ANN training
1: S = s1,s2, ... labeled training dataset of classified data
2: x1i,x2i, ...,xpi - p-dimensional vector of attributes of each sample si form S
3: N number of training cycles
4: Lrate learning rate
5: Random weight initialization
6: for all training cycles N do
7: for all samples S do
8: give features xi as input to the ANN
9: compare class of si with gained output of ANN
10: calculate error
11: using back-propagation tune weights inside the ANN with Lrate
12: end for
13: reduce Lrate
14: end for
2.2.5 Open Source and Freely available ML Tools
Today machine learning is widely used in many areas of research with many pub-
licly available tools (Software products, libraries etc.).
Weka or Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis is a popular, free, cross
platform and open source tool for machine learning. It supports many of popular ML
methods with possibility of fine tuning of the parameters and final results analysis.
It provides many features such as splitting dataset and graphical representation of
the results. Weka results are saved in .arff file which is specially prepared CSV file
with header. It suffers from couple of issues including no support for multi-thread
computations and poor memory utilization especially with big datasets.
Python weka wrapper is the package which allows using power of Weka
through Python programs. It uses javabridge to link Java-based Weka libraries to
python. It provides the same functionality as Weka, but provides more automation
capacities.
LIBSVM and LIBLINEAR are open source ML libraries written in C++ sup-
porting kernelized SVMs for linear, classification and regression analysis. Bindings
for Java, Mathlab and R are also present. It uses space-separated files as input, where
zero values need not to be mentioned.
RapidMiner is machine learning and data mining tool with a user friendly GUI
and support for a lot of ML and data mining algorithms.
Dlib is a free and cross-platform C++ toolkit which supports different -machine
learning algorithms and allows multi-threading and utilization of Python APIs.
2.2.6 Feature Selection & Construction process
Next important step after the characteristics extraction is so-called Feature Selection
process [32]. Feature Selection is a set of methods that focus on elimination of
irrelevant or redundant features that are not influential for malware classification.
14
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This is important since the number of characteristics can be extremely large, while
only a few can actually be used to differentiate malware and benign applications
with a high degree of confidence. The most common feature selection methods are
Information Gain, and Correlation-based Feature Subset Selection (CFS) [24]. The
final goal of Feature Selection is to simplify the process of knowledge transfer from
data to a reusable classification model.
2.3 Taxonomy of malware static analysis using Machine Learning
Our extensive literature study as reflected in Table 1 resulted to proposing a taxon-
omy for malware static analysis using machine learning as shown in Figure 5. Our
taxonomy depicts the most common methods for analysis of static characteristics,
extracting and selecting features and utilizing machine learning classification tech-
niques. Statistical Pattern Recognition process [26] was used as the basis for our
taxonomy modelling.
Fig. 5: Taxonomy of common malware detection process based on static character-
istics and Machine Learning
Year Authors Dataset Features FS ML
PE32 header
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2016 Cepeda et
al. [7]
7,630 malware and 1.818
goodware
57 features from
VirisTotal
ChiSqSelector
with 9
features
finally
SVM, RF, NN
2016 Le-Khac et
al. [35]
Malicious: 94 ;Benign:
620
Control Flow
Change and 2-6
n-grams
- Naive Bayes
2014 Markel et al.
[38]
Malicious: 122,799, Be-
nign: 42,003
46 features use
python ’pefile’
- Naive Bayes, Logistic
Regression, Classifica-
tion and Regression Tree
(CART)
2013 Khorsand et al.
[29]
Benign: 850 EXE and
750 DLL; Malware: 1600
from VX heavens
eliminated - Prediction by partial
matching
2012 Devi et al. [15] 4,075 PE files: 2954 ma-
licious and 1121 Win-
dows XP SP2 benign
2 + 5 features - BayesNet, k-NN, SVM,
AdaBoostM1, Decision
table, C4.5, Random
Forest, Random Tree
2011 Zhao [84] 3109 PE: 1037 viruses
from Vx Heavens and
2072 benign executable
on Win XP Sp3
24 features from PE
files using Control
Flow Graph-based
on nodes
Random Forest, Decision
Tree, Bagging, C4.5
2011 Ugarte-
Pedrero et
al. [77]
500 benign from WinXP
and 500 non-packed from
Vxheaven; 500 packed +
500 Zeus
166 structure fea-
tures of PE file
InfoGain Learning with Local and
Global Consistency, Ran-
dom Forest
2011 Santos et
al. [59]
500 benign and 500
malicious from VxHeav-
ens, also packed and not
packed
209 structural fea-
tures
InfoGain Collective Forest
2009 Tang [76] 361 executables and 449
normal trojan files
PE header structural
features
- Decision Tree
2009 Wang et
al. [80]
Benign: 1,908, Mali-
cious: 7,863
143 PE header en-
tries
InfoGain,
Gain raio
SVM
bytes n-gram sequences
2011 Jain et al. [27] 1,018 malware and 1,120
benign samples
1-8 byte, n-gram,
best n-gram by
documentwise
frequency
- NB, iBK, J48, Ad-
aBoost1, RandomForest
2007 Masud et
al. [39]
1st set - 1,435 executa-
bles: 597 of which are be-
nign and 838 are mali-
cious. 2nd set - 2,452 ex-
ecutables: 1,370 benign
and 1,082 malicious
500 best n-grams InfoGain SVM
2006 Reddy et
al. [51]
250 malware vs 250 be-
nign
100-500 best
n-gram
Document
Fre-
quency,
InfoGain
NB, iBK, Decision Tree
2004 Kolter et
al. [31]
1971 benign, 1651 mali-
cious from Vx Heaven
500 best n-grams InfoGain Naive Bayes, SVM, C4.5
opcode n-gram sequences
2016 Wang et
al. [79]
11,665 malware and
1,000 benign samples
2-tuple opcode se-
quences
information
entropy
density clustering
2015 Bragen [6] 992 malwares, 771 be-
nign from Windows Vista
1-4 n-gram opcode
with vocabulary
530-714,390
Cfs, Chi-
sqaured,
InfoGain,
ReliefF,
SymUncert.
Random Forest, C4.5,
Naive Bayes, bayes Net,
Baggin, ANN, SOM,
k-nn
2013 Santos et
al. [58]
13,189 malware vs
13,000 benign
top 1,000 features InfoGain Random Forest, J48,
k-Nearest Neighbours,
Bayesian networks, SVM
2011 Shahzad et
al. [62]
Benign: 300, Malicious:
300 on Windows XP
coabulary of 1,413
with n-gram=4
tf-idf ZeroR, Ripper, C4.5,
SVM, Naive Bayes, k-nn
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API calls
2012 Zabidi et
al. [83]
23 malware and 1 benign API calls, debugger
features, VM fea-
tures
- -
2012 Faruki et
al. [19]
3234 benign, 3256 mal-
ware
1-4 API call-gram - Random Forest, SVM,
ANN, C4.5, Naive bayes
2010 Shankarapani
et al. [71]
1593 PE files:875 benign
and 715 malicious
API calls sequence - SVM
2010 Sami et al. [55] 34,820 PE: 31,869 ma-
licious and 2951 benign
from Windows
API calls Fisher
Score
Random Forest, C4.5,
Naive Bayes
no features / not described
2012 Baig et al. [5] 200 packed PE and 200
unpacked from Windows
7, Windows 2003 Server
file entropy - -
2010 Dube et al. [17] 40,498 samples: 25,974
malware, 14,524 benign
from 32 bit files - Decision Tree
Table 1: Analysis of ML methods applicability for different types of static charac-
teristics
To get a clear picture on application domain of each machine learning and feature
selection method we analysed reported performance as shown in Figure 6.Majority
of researchers were using byte n-gram, opcode n-gram and PE32 header fields for
static analysis while C4.5, SVM or k-NN methods were mainly used for malware
detection. Information Gain is the prevalent method to define malware attributes.
Also we can see that n-gram-based method tend to use corresponding set of fea-
ture selection like tf-idf and Symmetric Uncertainty that are more relevant for large
number of similar sequences. On the other hand, PE32 header-based features tend to
provide higher entropies for classification and therefore Control-Flow graph-based
and Gain Ratio are more suitable for this task.
Fig. 6: Comparison of accuracy of various static characteristics with respect to fea-
ture selection and machine learning methods. Colour of the bubbles shows used
characteristics for detection, while size of the bubble denotes achieved accuracy
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To conclude, one can say that majority of authors either extract features that
offers good classification accuracy, or use conventional methods like Information
Gain. However, n-gram based characteristics need other FS approaches to elimi-
nate irrelevant features. Rule-based ML is the most commonly used classification
method along with SVM. Forest-based method tends to be more applicable for
PE32 header-based features. Also ANN is not commonly-used technique. While
most of the works achieved accuracies of 80-100%, some Bayes-based methods
offered much lower accuracy even down to 50% only.
3 Approaches for Malware Feature Construction
Similar the previous works, following four sets of static properties are suggested for
feature classification in this paper:
PE32 header features characterize the PE32 header information using the PE-
frame tools [77]. Following numerical features will be used in our experiments:
• ShortInfo Directories describes 16 possible data directories available in PE file.
The most commonly used are ”Import”, ”Export”, ”Resource”, ”Debug”, ”Relo-
cation”.
• ShortInfo Xor indicates detected XOR obfuscation.
• ShortInfo DLL is a binary flag of whether a file is executable or dynamically-
linked library.
• ShortInfo FileSize measures size of a binary file in bytes.
• ShortInfo Detected shows present techniques used to evade the detection by anti-
viruses like hooks to disable execution in virtualized environment or suspicious
API calls.
• ShortInfo Sections is a number of subsections available in the header.
• DigitalSignature contains information about the digital signatture that can be
present in a file
• Packer describes used packer detected by PEframe
• AntiDebug gives insight into the techniques used to prevent debugging process.
• AntiVM is included to prevent the execution in a virtualize environment.
• SuspiciousAPI indicates functions calls that are labelled by PEframe as suspi-
cious.
• SuspiciousSections contains information about suspicious sections like ”.rsrc
\u0000 \u0000 \u0000”
• Url is a number of different url addresses found in the binary file.
Byte n-gram. N-gram is a sequence of some items (with minimum length of 1)
that are predefined as minimal parts of the object expressed in Bytes. By having the
file represented as a sequence of bytes we can construct 1-gram, 2-gram, 3-gram etc.
N-grams of bytes, or byte n-grams are widely used as features for machine learning
and static malware analysis [27, 51].
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Reddy et al. [51] used n-grams of size 2,3 and 4 with combination of SVM,
Instance-based learner and Decision Tree algorithms to distinguish between mali-
cious and benign executables. After extracting n-grams they used class-wise docu-
ment frequency as a feature selection measure and showed that class-wise document
frequency is performing better than Information Gain as a feature selection measure.
Jain et al. [27] used n-grams in range of 1 to 8 as features and Naive Bayes, Instance
Based Learner and AdaBoost1 [3] as machine learning algorithms for malware
classification and reported byte 3-grams as the best technique.
Opcode n-gram represent a set of instructions that will be performed on the CPU
when binary is executed. These instructions are called operational codes or opcodes.
To extract opcodes from executable we need to perform disassembly procedure. Af-
ter this opcodes will be represented as short instructions names such as POP, PUSH,
MOV, ADD, SUB etc. Santos et al. [58] described a method to distinguish between
malicious and benign executables or detecting different malware families using op-
code sequences of length 1 to 4 using Random Forest, J48, k-Nearest Neighbours,
Bayesian Networks and Support Vector Machine algorithms [3].
API calls is a set of tools and routines that help to develop a program using
existent functionality of an operating system. Since most of the malware samples
are platform dependent it is very much likely that their developers have use APIs
as well. Therefore, analysing API calls usage among benign and malicious software
can help to find malware-specific API calls and therefore are suitable to be used
as a feature for machine learning algorithms. For example, [71] successfully used
Support Vector Machines with frequency of API calls for malware classification.
[78] provided a methodology for classification of malicious and benign executables
using API calls and n-grams with n from 1 to 4 and achieved accuracy of 97.23%
for 1-gram features. [19] used so-called API call-gram model with sequence length
ranging from 1-4 and reached accuracy of 97.7% was achieved by training with 3-
grams. In our experiments we are going to use 1 and 2 n-grams as features generated
from API calls.
4 Experimental Design
All experiments were conducted on a dedicated Virtual machine (VM) on Ubuntu
14.04 server running on Xen 4.4. The server had an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3820 CPU
@ 3.60GHz with 4 cores (8 threads), out of which 2 cores (4 threads) were provided
to the VM. Disk space is allocated on the SSD RAID storage based on Samsung
845DC. Installed server memory was Kingston PC-1600 RAM, out of which 8GB
was available for the VM. Operating system was an Ubuntu 14.04 64 bit running on
ae dedicated VM together with all default tools and utilities available in the OS’s
repository. Files pre-processing were performed using bash scripts due to native
support in Linux OS. To store extracted features we utilised MySQL 5.5 database
engine together with Python v 2.7.6 and PHP v 5.5.9 connectors.
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For the experiments we used a set of benign and malicious samples. To authors
knowledge there have not been published any large BENIGN SOFTWARE REFER-
ENCE DATASETS, so we have to create our own set of benign files. Since the focus
of the paper is mainly on PE32 Windows executables, we decided to extract corre-
sponding known-to-be-good files from different versions of MS Windows, includ-
ing different software and multimedia programs installations that are available. The
OSes that we processed were 32 bit versions of Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows
8.1 and Windows 10. Following two Windows malware datasets were used in our
research:
1. VX HEAVEN [2] dedicated to distribute information about the computer viruses
and contains 271,092 sorted samples dating back from 1999.
2. VIRUS SHARE [1] represent sharing resource that offers 29,119,178 malware
samples and accessible through VirusShare tracker as of 12th of July, 2017. We
utilized following two archives: VirusShare 00000.zip created on 2012-06-15
00:39:38 with a size of 13.56 GB and VirusShare 00207.zip created on 2015-
12-16 22:56:17 with a size of 13.91 GB, all together contained 131,072 unique,
uncategorised and unsorted malware samples. They will be referred further as
malware 000 and malware 207.
To be able to perform experiments on the dataset, we have to filter out irrelevant
samples (not specific PE32 and not executables), which are out of scope in this
paper. However, processing of more than 100k samples put limitations and require
non-trivial approaches to handle such amount of files. We discovered that common
ways of working with files in directory such that simple ls and mv in bash take
unreasonable amount of time to execute. Also there is no way to distinguish files
by extension like *.dll or *.exe since the names are just md5 sums. So, following
filtering steps were performed:
1. Heap of unfiltered malware and benign files were placed into two directories
”malware/” and ”benign/”.
2. To eliminate duplicates, we renamed all the files to their MD5 sums.
3. PE32 files were detected in each folder using file Linux command:
\$ f i l e 000000 b 4 d c c f b a a 5 b d 9 8 1 a f 2 c 1 b b f 5 9 a
000000 b 4 d c c f b a a 5 b d 9 8 1 a f 2 c 1 b b f 5 9 a : PE32 e x e c u t a b l e (
DLL) ( GUI ) I n t e l 80386 , f o r MS Windows
4. All PE32 files from current directory that meet our requirement were scrapped
and move to a dedicated one:
# ! / b i n / sh
cd . . / windows1 ;
c o u n t e r =0;
f o r i in ∗ ; do
c o u n t e r =$ ( ( c o u n t e r +1) ) ;
echo ” $ c o u n t e r ” ;
VAR=” f i l e $ i | g re p PE32 ” ;
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VAR1=$ ( e v a l ”$VAR” ) ;
l e n 1 =${#VAR1} ;
i f [ −n ”$VAR1” ] && [ ” $ l e n 1 ” −g t ” 1 ” ] ;
then
echo ”$VAR1” | awk ’{ p r i n t $1 } ’ | awk ’{ gsub ( / : $ / , ” ”
) ; p r i n t $1 ” . . / windows / PE / ” $1 } ’ | x a r g s mv −f ;
e l s e
echo ” o t h e r ” ;
f i l e $ i | awk ’{ p r i n t $1 } ’ | awk ’{ gsub ( / : $ / , ” ” ) ;
p r i n t $1 ” . . / windows / o t h e r / ” $1 } ’ | x a r g s mv −f
;
f i
done
5. We further can see a variety of PE32 modifications for 32bit architecture:
PE32 e x e c u t a b l e ( GUI ) I n t e l 80386 , f o r MS Windows
PE32 e x e c u t a b l e (DLL) ( GUI ) I n t e l 80386 , f o r MS
Windows
PE32 e x e c u t a b l e ( GUI ) I n t e l 80386 , f o r MS Windows ,
UPX compressed
Following our purpose to concentrate on 32bit architecture, only PE32 are filtered
out from all possible variants of PE32 files shown about.
6. After extracting a target group of benign and malicious PE32 files, multiple
rounds of feature extraction are performed according to methods used in the lit-
erature.
7. Finally, we insert extracted features into the corresponding MySQL database to
ease the handling, feature selection and machine learning processes respectively.
After collecting all possible files and performing the pre-processing phase, we
ended up with the sets represented in the Table 2.
Table 2: Characteristics of the dataset collected and used for our experiments after
filtering PE files
Dataset Number of files Size
Benign 16,632 7.4GB
Malware 000 58,023 14.0GB
Malware 207 41,899 16.0GB
Further, feature construction and extraction routine from PE files was performed
using several tools as follows:
1. PEFRAME [4] is an open source tool specifically designed for static analysis
of PE malware. It extracts various information from PE header ranging from
packers to anti debug and anti vm tricks.
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2. HEXDUMP is a standard Linux command line tool which is used to display a file
in specific format like ASCII or one-byte octal.
3. OBJDUMP is a standard Linux command line too to detect applications instruc-
tions, consumed memory addresses, etc.
5 Results & Discussions
Before testing different ML techniques for malware detection it is important to show
that our datasets actually represent the real-world distribution of the malware and
goodware. Comparison of ”Compile Time” field of PE32 header can be utilized for
this purpose. Figure 7 represents log-scale histogram of the compilation time for
our benign dataset. Taking into consideration the Windows OS timeline we found a
harmony between our benign dataset applications compile time and development of
Microsoft Windows operating systems. To start with, Windows 3.1 was originally
released on April 6, 1992 and our plot of benign applications indicates the biggest
spike in early 1992. Later on in 1990th, Windows 95 was due on 24 August 1995,
while next Windows 98 was announced on 25 June 1998. Further, 2000th marked
release of Windows XP on October 25, 2001. Next phases on the plot correspond
to the release of Windows Vista on 30th January 2007 and Windows 7 on 22nd
October 2009. Next popular version (Windows 8) appeared on 26th October 2012
and the latest major spike in the end of 2014 corresponds to the release of Windows
10 on 29th July 2015.
Further, compilation time distribution for the first malware dataset malware 000
is given in the Figure 8. We can clearly see that release of newer Windows version
is always followed by an increase of cumulative distribution of malware samples in
following 6 to 12 month. It can be seen that the release of 32bit Windows 3.1 cause
a spike in a number of malware. After this the number of malware compiled each
year is constantly growing. Then, another increase can be observed in second half
of the 2001 which corresponds to the release of the Windows XP and so on.
Considering the fact that MS DOS was released in 1981 it makes compilation
times before this day look like fake or just obfuscated intentionally. On the other
hand the dataset malware 000 cannot have dates later than June 2012. Therefore,
malware with compilation time prior to 1981 or later than Jan 2012 are tampered
5.1 Accuracy of ML-aided Malware Detection using Static
Characteristics
This part presents results of apply Naive Bayes, BayesNet, C4.5, k-NN, SVM, ANN
and NF machine learning algorithms against static features of our dataset namely
PE32 header, Bytes n-gram, Opcode n-gram, and API calls n-gram.
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Fig. 7: Log-scale histogram of compilation times for benign dataset
Fig. 8: Log-scale histogram of compilation times for malware 000 dataset
5.1.1 PE32 header
PE32 header is one of the most important features relevant to threat intelligence of
PE32 applications. We performed feature selection using Cfs and InfoGain methods
with 5-fold cross-validation as presented in the Table 3.
We can clearly see that the features from the Short Info section in PE32 headers
can be used as a stand-alone malware indicators, including different epochs. Num-
ber of directories in this section as well as file size and flag of EXE or DLL have
bigger merits in comparison to other features. To contrary, Anti Debug and Suspi-
cious API sections from PEframe cannot classify a binary file. Finally, we can say
that digital signature and Anti VM files in PE32 headers are almost irrelevant in
malware detection. Further, we performed exploration of selected ML methods that
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Fig. 9: Log-scale histogram of compilation times for malware 207 dataset
Table 3: Feature selection on PE32 features. Bold font denotes selected features
according to InfoGain method
Benign vs Malware 000 Benign vs Malware 207 Malware 000 vs Malware 207
Information Gain
merit attribute merit attribute merit attribute
0.377 ShortInfo Directories 0.369 ShortInfo DLL 0.131 ShortInfo FileSize
0.278 ShortInfo DLL 0.252 ShortInfo Directories 0.094 ShortInfo Detected
0.118 AntiDebug 0.142 ShortInfo FileSize 0.064 SuspiciousAPI
0.099 Packer 0.105 SuspiciousSections 0.044 ShortInfo Directories
0.088 SuspiciousSections 0.101 SuspiciousAPI 0.036 Packer
0.082 ShortInfo Xor 0.089 AntiDebug 0.028 AntiDebug
0.076 SuspiciousAPI 0.084 ShortInfo Detected 0.017 SuspiciousSections
0.045 ShortInfo FileSize 0.054 ShortInfo Xor 0.016 Url
0.034 ShortInfo Detected 0.050 Packer 0.015 AntiVM
0.022 Url 0.036 Url 0.012 ShortInfo Xor
0.004 AntiVM 0.002 AntiVM 0.002 ShortInfo DLL
0 ShortInfo Sections 0 ShortInfo Sections 0 ShortInfo Sections
0 DigitalSignature 0 DigitalSignature 0 DigitalSignature
Cfs
attribute attribute attribute
ShortInfo Directories ShortInfo Directories ShortInfo Directories
ShortInfo Xor ShortInfo Xor ShortInfo FileSize
ShortInfo DLL ShortInfo DLL ShortInfo Detected
ShortInfo Detected Packer
Url
can be used with selected features. By extracting corresponding numerical features
mentioned earlier, we were able to achieve classification accuracy levels presented
in Table 4. Table 3 presents also accuracy of ML method after performing feature
selection. Here we used whole sub-sets defined by Cfs method and features with
merit of ≥ 0.1 detected by InfoGain.
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Table 4: Comparative classification accuracy based on features from PE32 header,
in %. Bn, Ml 000 and Ml 207 are benign and two malaware datasets respectively
Dataset Naive Bayes BayesNet C4.5 k-NN SVM ANN NF
All features
Bn vs Ml 000 90.29 91.42 97.63 97.30 87.75 95.08 92.46
Bn vs Ml 207 88.27 91.21 96.43 95.99 84.88 93.24 89.03
Ml 000 vs Ml 207 63.41 71.59 82.45 82.11 73.77 69.99 69.01
Information Gain
Bn vs Ml 000 88.32 89.17 94.09 94.01 94.09 93.51 87.53
Bn vs Ml 207 87.25 90.39 95.06 94.58 84.55 92.37 87.88
Ml 000 vs Ml 207 58.26 67.05 67.77 70.70 69.46 63.19 51.31
Cfs
Bn vs Ml 000 89.35 90.89 95.39 95.38 95.16 93.69 85.85
Bn vs Ml 207 86.88 89.67 91.61 91.68 91.68 91.68 81.91
Ml 000 vs Ml 207 67.45 70.95 76.98 76.92 72.15 68.18 67.06
Malware and goodware can be easily classified using full set as well as sub-set
of features. One can notice that ANN and C4.5 performed much better than other
methods. It can be also seen that the high quality of these features made them very
appropriate to differentiate between the benign and malware 000 dataset. Further,
we can see that the two datasets malware 000 and malware 207 are similar and
extracted features do not provide a high classification accuracy. Neural Network
was used with 3 hidden layers making it a non-linear model and experiments were
performed using 5-fold cross-validation technique.
5.1.2 Bytes n-gram
Bytes n-gram is a very popular method for static analysis of binary executables.
This method has one significant benefit: in order to perform analysis there is no
need of previous knowledge about file type and internal structure since we use its
raw (binary) form. For feature construction we used random profiles that were first
presented by Ebringer et al. [18] called fixed sample count (see Figure 10), which
generates fixed number of random profiles regardless of the file size and sliding
window algorithm. In this method each file is represented in a hexadecimal format
and frequencies of each byte are counted to build a Huffman tree for each file. Then
using window of fixed size and moving it on fixed skip size the randomness profile
of each window is calculated. A Randomness profile is sum of Huffman code length
of each byte in a single window. The lower the randomness in a particular window
the bigger will be the randomness of that profile.
We chose 32 bytes as the most promising sliding window size [18, 48, 74] and
due to big variety of file sizes in our dataset, we chose 30 best features (or pruning
size in terminology from [18]) which are the areas of biggest randomness (the most
unique parts) in their original order. This features was fed into different machine
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Fig. 10: Sliding window algorithm [18]
learning algorithms as shown in Table 5. Our results indicate that the accuracy of
this technique is not that high as it was originally developed to preserve local details
of a file ( [18])while the size of file affects localness a lot. In our case file sizes vary
from around 0.5Kb to 53.7Mb which adversely affect the results. Despite worse
results it is still easier to distinguish between benign executables and malware than
between malware from different time slices. Also we can see that ANN is better in
Benign vs Malware 000 dataset, C4.5 in Benign vs Malware 207 and Malware 000
vs Malware 207 datasets.
Table 5: Classification accuracy based on features from bytes n-gram randomness
profiles, in %
Dataset Naive Bayes BayesNet C4.5 k-NN SVM ANN NF
All features
Bn vs Ml 000 69.9 60.4 76.9 75.6 78.3 78.3 74.8
Bn vs Ml 207 70.3 68.2 75.8 75.6 72.1 71.6 68.2
Ml 000 vs Ml 207 50.1 64.0 68.1 64.7 58.1 60.1 58.2
Also it should be noted that we did not use feature selection methods as in the
case of PE32 header features. Both Information gain and Cfs are not efficient due to
the similarity of features and equivalence in importance for classification process.
For the first dataset the Information Gain was in the range of 0.0473-0.0672 while
for the second dataset it was in the range of 0.0672-0.1304 and for the last it was
0.0499-0.0725. Moreover, Cfs produces best feature subset nearly equal to full set.
Therefore, we decided to use all features as there is no subset that could possibly be
better than original one.
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(a) Less than 1M (b) Bigger than 1M
Fig. 11: Distribution of file size values in Bytes for three classes
5.1.3 Opcode n-gram
Opcode n-gram consists of assembly instructions which construct the executable
file. The main limitation of this method is that in order to gain opcodes we need
disassemble an application which sometimes fails to give correct opcodes due to
different anti-disassembly and packing techniques used in executables hence we fil-
tered out this kind of files from our dataset. We extracted 100 most common 3- and
4-grams from each of three file sets in our dataset. Then we extracted a set of 200
most common n-grams - which are called feature n-grams - to build a presence vec-
tor where value 1 was assigned if a certain n-gram from feature n-grams is present in
top 100 most used n-grams of the file. Table 6 represents results of feature selection
performed on the dataset with 3-grams. As can be seen the first two pair of datasets
have a lot of common n-grams, while selected n-grams for the third pair of dataset is
totally different. For Information Gain the threshold of 0.1 was used for both benign
and malware datasets, while for the last set we used InfoGain of 0.02.
These data were passed to machine learning algorithms and results are shown in
Tables 7 and 9. As can be seen C4.5 performed well and had the highest accuracy
almost in all experiments. Also feature selection significantly reduced the number
of n-grams from 200 down to 10-15, while overall accuracy on all methods did not
dropped significantly. In fact, Naive Bayes performed even better that can be justi-
fied by reduced complexity of the probabilistic model. Also NF showed much better
accuracy in comparison to other methods when using all features to distinguish be-
tween two malware datasets which can be linked to non-linear correlation in the data
that are circumscribed in the Gaussian fuzzy patches.
Further, we investigated if there is any correlation between n-grams in files
that belong to both benign and malicious classes. We extracted relative frequency
of each n-gram according to the following formula hn−gram =
NClassf iles ∈ n−gram
NClassf iles
, where
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Table 6: Feature selection on 3-gram opcode features. Bold font denotes features
that present in both datasets that include nenign samples
Benign vs Malware 000 Benign vs Malware 207 Malware 000 vs Malware 207
Information Gain
merit attribute merit attribute merit attribute
0.302483 int3movpush 0.298812 int3movpush 0.042229 pushlcallpushl
0.283229 int3int3mov 0.279371 int3int3mov 0.039779 movtestjne
0.266485 popretint3 0.227489 popretint3 0.037087 callpushlcall
0.236949 retint3int3 0.202162 retint3int3 0.031045 pushpushlcall
0.191866 jmpint3int3 0.193938 jmpint3int3
0.134709 callmovtest 0.108580 retpushmov
0.133258 movtestje
0.115976 callmovpop
0.114482 testjemov
0.101328 poppopret
0.100371 movtestjne
Cfs
attribute attribute attribute
movtestje movmovadd pushpushlcall
callmovtest retpushmov movtestjne
callmovpop xormovmov movmovjmp
retint3int3 callmovtest jecmpje
popretint3 popretint3 cmpjepush
pushmovadd pushmovadd pushleacall
int3int3mov int3int3mov callpopret
callmovjmp callmovjmp leaveretpush
jmpint3int3 jmpint3int3 pushmovadd
int3movpush int3movpush pushcalllea
callpushlcall
callmovlea
pushlcallpushl
movmovmovl
calljmpmov
Table 7: Classification accuracy based on features from opcode 3-gram, in %
Dataset Naive Bayes BayesNet C4.5 k-NN SVM ANN NF
All features
Bn vs Ml 000 83.51 83.52 95.53 93.82 94.43 94.51 95.28
Bn vs Ml 207 84.52 84.52 93.93 91.84 92.32 92.44 93.20
Mn 000 vs Ml 207 63.73 63.73 81.21 78.64 75.42 76.64 83.13
Information Gain
Bn vs Ml 000 86.74 86.94 90.41 90.45 89.98 90.26 84.45
Bn vs Ml 207 86.22 86.22 86.22 86.22 87.46 87.48 83.36
Mn 000 vs Ml 207 63.19 62.55 71.19 71.89 69.54 67.36 69.14
Cfs
Bn vs Ml 000 87.79 88.66 91.15 91.22 90.90 90.82 85.31
Bn vs Ml 207 86.24 86.33 89.92 89.73 89.17 89.34 81.58
Mn 000 vs Ml 207 86.24 86.33 89.92 89.73 89.17 89.34 69.25
NClassf iles ∈ n−gram indicates number of files in class that has n-gram and N
Class
f iles is a total
number of files in this class. The results for 3-gram is depicted in the Figure 12.
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As a reference we took top 20 most frequent n-grams from benign class and found
frequency of the corresponding n-grams from both malware datasets. It can be seen
that the frequency does not differ fundamentally, yet n-grams for both malicious
classes tend to have very close numbers in comparison to benign files. Moreover,
there is a clear dependency between both malicious classes. We also can notice that
most of the features selected from two datasets that includes benign samples are
same. This highlights reliability of the selected 4-grams and generalization of this
method for malware detection.
Fig. 12: Distribution of the frequencies of top 20 opcode 3-grams from benign set
in comparison to both malicious datasets
Additionally, we studied 4-gram features and extracted 200 features as shown in
Table 8. Similar to the 3-grams features selected in the Table 6 one can see that two
first pairs of datasets have a lot of common features, while the last one provides
a significantly different set. As in case with 3-grams we used Information Gain
with threshold of 0.1 for both benign and the first malware dataset, while for the
last malware set we used InfoGain of 0.02, which looks reasonable with respect to
number of selected‘ features.
The classification performance is given in Figure 9. As can be seen, 3-grams can
show a bit better result than 4-grams in case of distinguishing between benign and
malware 000 or Benign and malware 207 with C4.5 classifier. At the same time
4-grams are better in order to distinguish between two malware datasets with C4.5
classifier. We can conclude that results are quite good, and can be used for malware
detection. In our opinion results can be improved by extracting more features and
usage of relative frequencies rather than pure vectors.
In contrary to 3-grams we can see that the histograms of 4-grams have funda-
mental differences when it comes to malicious and benign sets as it is depicted in
Figure 13. We can see that the frequencies correspond to malware 000 and mal-
ware 207 datasets are nearly similar and are far from the frequencies detected for
the benign class. Moreover, there is a clear and strong correlation between two mal-
ware datasets. So, we can conclude that in case of probabilistic-based models like
Bayes Network and Naive Bayes the classification could be a bit better due to dif-
ferences in likelihood of appearance, which can be also found in Tables 7 and 9.
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Table 8: Feature selection on on 4-gram opcode features. Bold font denotes features
that present in both datasets that include nenign samples
Benign vs Malware 000 Benign vs Malware 207 Malware 000 vs Malware 207
Information Gain
merit attribute merit attribute merit attribute
0.303209 int3int3movpush 0.295427 int3int3movpush 0.047452 pushlcallpushlcall
0.295280 int3movpushmov 0.286378 int3movpushmov 0.045860 movpoppopret
0.285608 int3int3int3mov 0.266966 int3int3int3mov 0.044750 jepushcallpop
0.258733 popretint3int3 0.229431 jmpint3int3int3 0.044573 callpushlcallpushl
0.241215 poppopretint3 0.224318 poppopretint3 0.038822 cmpjepushcall
0.233205 jmpint3int3int3 0.210289 popretint3int3 0.035731 pushcallpopret
0.220679 retint3int3int3 0.170367 retint3int3int3 0.030460 pushcallpopmov
0.185178 movpopretint3 0.148442 movpopretint3 0.028564 movcmpjepush
0.151337 movpushmovsub 0.116760 movpushmovsub 0.025813 cmpjecmpje
0.125703 pushcallmovtest 0.103841 movpushmovpush 0.024372 leaveretpushmov
0.104993 movpushmovpush 0.102730 movpushmovmov 0.023374 pushpushpushlcall
0.104416 movpushmovmov 0.022312 pushcallpoppop
0.021929 movtestjepush
0.020003 pushpushleapush
Cfs
attribute attribute attribute
incaddincadd addaddaddadd leaveretpushmov
movpushmovsub movmovpushpush callmovtestje
jmpmovmovmov movpushmovsub jepushcallpop
pushcallmovtest pushcallmovtest pushlcallpushlcall
int3int3int3mov int3int3int3mov pushpushpushlea
movpoppopret movxormovmov jecmpjecmp
jmpint3int3int3 pushlcallpushlcall movpoppopret
movpopretint3 jmpint3int3int3 pushcallmovpush
int3int3movpush movpopretint3 pushmovmovcall
int3movpushmov int3int3movpush movpopretint3
poppopretint3 int3movpushmov cmpjepushcall
addpushpushpush poppopretint3 movleamovmov
pushpushcalllea movmovjmpmov
pushpushcalllea
retnopnopnop
movaddpushpush
subpushpushpush
Fig. 13: Distribution of the frequencies of top 20 opcode 4-grams from benign set
in comparison to both malicious datasets
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Table 9: Classification accuracy based on features from opcode 4-gram, in %
Dataset Naive Bayes BayesNet C4.5 k-NN SVM ANN NF
All features
Bn vs Ml 000 86.92 86.92 95.31 93.73 94.28 94.23 95.54
Bn vs Ml 207 86.84 86.84 93.33 91.71 92.03 92.04 93.75
Ml 000 vs Ml 207 64.90 64.90 81.58 78.98 74.98 75.77 78.80
Information Gain
Bn vs Ml 000 87.79 87.89 91.48 91.45 91.31 90.84 85.74
Bn vs Ml 207 84.64 84.57 87.84 87.83 87.25 87.70 48.67
Mn 000 vs Ml 207 62.73 63.20 69.96 70.25 68.40 67.24 68.90
Cfs
Bn vs Ml 000 89.63 89.63 91.51 91.52 91.52 90.76 84.95
Bn vs Ml 207 86.41 86.64 89.36 89.48 89.16 89.12 81.13
Mn 000 vs Ml 207 66.28 66.17 72.00 72.27 68.96 69.17 69.32
5.1.4 API call n-grams
API calls n-grams is the combination of specific operations invoked by the process
in order to use functionalities of an operation system. In this study we used peframe
to extract API calls from PE32 files. The bigger the n-gram size is the lower accuracy
is possible to gain. The reason for this is that single API calls and their n-grams are
far fewer in comparison with for example opcode n-grams. After extraction of API
calls, we combined them into 1- and 2-grams. For each task we selected 100 most
frequent features in a particular class and combined them into 200-feature vectors.
Tables 10 and 11 presents results of machine learning evaluation on API call n-
grams data.
As we can see ANN, k-NN and C4.5 are the best classifiers similar to previous
results. It is also more difficult to distinguish between files from malware 000 and
malware 207. We gained quite high accuracy, but it is still lower than in related
studies. It could be explained by the size of datasets: other studies datasets usually
consist of several hundreds or thousands of files while our dataset has more than
110,000 files. After analysing feature selection results we decided not to include
them in the results section since most of the features are similar in terms of dis-
tinguishing between malware and goodware. It means that there is large number of
unique API calls that can be found once or twice in a file in contrary to the byte or
opcode n-gram
Table 10: Classification accuracy based on API call 1-gram features, %
Dataset Naive Bayes BayesNet C4.5 k-NN SVM ANN NF
All features
Bn vs Ml 000 90.79 90.79 93.39 93.47 93.51 93.43 82.44
Bn vs Ml 207 87.18 87.18 90.94 91.03 91.37 91.23 81.28
Ml 000 vs Ml 207 66.19 66.2 78.44 77.09 73.33 72.77 73.55
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Table 11: Classification accuracy based on API call 2-gram features, %
Dataset Naive Bayes BayesNet C4.5 k-NN SVM ANN NF
All features
Bn vs Ml 000 86.54 86.55 90.88 91.53 91.96 91.85 75.24
Bn vs Ml 207 81.94 81.91 87.84 88.82 88.31 87.81 83.61
Ml 000 vs Ml 207 62.31 62.31 73.69 73.17 70.27 69.45 70.08
We also studied the difference between frequencies distributions of API calls.
Figure 14 sketches extracted API 1-grams from three datasets. One can see that
there is a significant spread between numbers of occurrences in benign class in
contrary to both malicious datasets. On the other hand, results for both malware
datasets are similar, which indicates statistical significance of extracted features. It
is important ho highlight that the largest scatter are in frequencies for memset(),
malloc() and free() API calls. On the other hand, malicious programs tend to use
GetProcAddress() function more often for retrieving the address of any function
from dynamic-link libraries in the system.
Fig. 14: frequencies of 20 most frequent API 1-grams for three different datasets
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a survey on applications of machine learning tech-
niques for static analysis of PE32 Windows malware. First, we elaborated on differ-
ent methods for extracting static characteristics of the executable files. Second, an
overview of different machine learning methods utilized for classification of static
characteristics of PE32 files was given. In addition, we offered a taxonomy of mal-
ware static features and corresponding ML methods. Finally, we provided a tutorial
on how to apply different ML methods on benign and malware dataset for classifica-
tion. We found that C4.5 and k-NN in most cases perform better than other methods,
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while SVM and ANN on some feature sets showed good performance. On the other
hand Bayes Network and Naive Bayes have poor performance compared to other
ML methods. This can be explained by negligibly low probabilities which present
in a large number of features such as opcode and bytes n-grams. So, it can see that
static-analysis using ML is a fast and reliable mechanism to classify malicious and
benign samples considering different characteristic of PE32 executables. Machine
Learning- aided static malware analysis can be used as part of Cyber Threat Intel-
ligence (CTI) activities to automate detection of indications of compromise from
static features of PE32 Windows files.
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